Cahier 2018-19| Title: | Renewal of water-related infrastructure and user's contribution: a few benchmarks | | Abstract: | This paper studies the contribution required from the users of collective drinking water networks to finance asset management of infrastructures. We characterize the first-best optimum and we compare it to the social optimum in the presence of preferences heterogeneity, in order to take into account the uses of alternative techniques for certain household needs. These alternatives uses generate negative externalities for the good functioning of the water networks. The first-best optimum thus requires a transfer from the exclusive users of the collective network to the users of the alternatives. Furthermore, Nash equilibrium reveals that the existence of this transfer requires other motivations than the only usage values. Finally, the case of water infrastructure asset management emphasizes how an essential part of inequality that can be associated with it can be attributed to preferences heterogeneity. | | Keyword(s): | water services ; willigness to pay ; pur public good ; game theory | | Auteur(s) : | Epiphane Assouan, Tina Rambonilaza, Bénédicte Rulleau | | JEL Class.: | C72, H41, H54, Q25 | Télécharger le cahier Retour à la liste des Cahier du GRETHA (2018) |
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